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Of all the arts known to man medicine has long been revered as one
of the most noble. It is indeed a tragic commentary on the state of the
profession, in light of the vast scientific advances in the healing arts and
the almost unbelievable manipulative surgical techniques of today's sur-
geons, that rather than the patient and the physician being drawn closer
together, a wedge of fear and distrust has been driven firmly between
them."
A startling manifestation of this distrust appeared in an issue of the
Insurance Law Journal where the author, concluding his remarks con-
cerning the almost unbelievable rise in the number of medical mal-
practice cases, stated:
In lecturing to M.D.'s, I have always emphasized the need for
mutual cooperation on the theory if the M.D.'s do not hang to-
gether they will most assuredly hang separately. Evidently we
must broaden that warning into if all aspects of the medical pro-
fession do not hang together they will most assuredly hang
separately.2
With this as a point of departure, it will be the intent of this discus-
sion to examine the relationship between physician and patient as it
exists today with particular emphasis on the legal complexities arising
out of medical treatment rendered at the scene of an emergency.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF MALPRACTICE
The first reported case of a physician being brought to bar for mal-
practice appeared in the latter part of the twelfth century when a sur-
1. Between the years 1935 and 1955 there were 605 reported cases of medical pro-
fessional liability in the United States. Sandor, The History of Professional Liability
Suits in the United States, 163 J.A.M.A. 459 (1956).
In the year 1959, six thousand physicians were sued for medical malpractice.
Crawford, Malpractice: Medical-The Important Events of the Last Two Years, 30
INS. CouN. J. 44, 67 (1963).
"A recent survey indicates that there are over 5,000 malpractice cases being tried
each year and that thousands each year are being settled out of court." Stewart,
Bradford, & Kelly, Medical Malpractice, 27 INs. CouN. J. 621, 622 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as Stewart].
2. Crawford, supra note 1, at 67.
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geon undertook to treat an injured hand, and allegedly treated it so
negligently that he maimed the patient.3 While the plaintiff's suit was
dismissed, the court did indicate that it felt the surgeon had acted with
all due diligence and had performed as well as be was able. This de-
velopment in the law suggested that the early English courts were un-
willing to require the application of any external or objective standards
of care in measuring a physician's professional performance.
As the law of malpractice developed, the English courts began to
recognize the need for a rule of law that would establish some external
standard against which the physician's skills could be measured. Finally,
they arrived at a rule of law that would hold the physician liable when
he assumed to undertake the care of a patient and performed deficiently
either through ignorance or lack of skill.
In America, a 1794 Connecticut case4 was the first in which the pro-
fessional liability of a physician was at question. The complaint alleged
that the physician had performed an operation in an ignorant and un-
skillful manner and the cause was held to be sufficient in law. Some
sixty years later a Pennsylvania court,5 discussing the physician-de-
fendant's mode of treatment, stated that "the question was not whether
the doctor had brought to the case skill enough to make the (patient's)
leg as straight and as long as the other, but whether he had employed
such reasonable skill and diligence, as [was] ordinarly exercised in the
profession." "
With the development of contract law, the American courts became
aware that the physicians' services were often rendered pursuant to a
contract, and, increasingly, began to express liability in contractual
terms. The measure of skill and care which the law required of the
physician was not at all changed by basing a cause of action for the
physician's liability in breach of implied contract for failure to possess
and exercise the requisite skill and care. This contractual cause coupled
with the earlier action resulting from the physician's failure to exhibit
the necessary knowledge or demonstrate the requisite skill, when he
assumed an undertaking, merely allowed two distinct actions under
which the physician could be held liable.
Today the actions are unchanged even though the "law of medicine"
has been refined. The physician is not considered to be a "warrantor of
. G. DRIVER & J. Mu.Es, Trm BABYtowN LAWS 81 (1955).
4. Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90; (1794).
5. McCandless v. McWha, 22 Pa. 261 (1853).
6. Id. at 267-68.
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cures." 7 He is held only to that standard of medical skill and knowledge
commonly practiced and possessed by members of the same or similar
community, and that degree of care and skill ordinarily exercised by
those physicians in the application of their skill, or the unique skill of the
specialist, if the physician represented himself as possessing it.8
The physician, although liable for his acts and omissions once he
undertakes the treatment of a patient,,is under no positive duty or ob-
ligation to accept for treatment all who apply to him. He has the
right to refuse to render medical treatment without regard to the needs
of the patient. This right of refusal was first granted in the landmark
case of Hurley v. Eddingfield.9 There, the defendant-physician had
established himself as a general practitioner of medicine in the com-
munity and had been decedent's family physician for some time. The de-
cedent, after becoming dangerously ill, sent for the physician. The de-
cedent's wife informed the doctor of her husband's violent sickness,
and offered him his fee for his services. She explained to him that no
other physician would be available in time, and that they relied heavily
on him for medical attention. "Without any reason whatever, [the
physician] refused to render aid to decedent. No other patients were re-
quiring [the physician's] immediate service, and he could have gone to
the relief of decedent if he had been willing to do so. Death insued .... I
The physician was held not liable. The actions of the physician in this
case are discomforting at best and appear to be in direct conflict with
the "Principles of Medical Ethics" of the American Medical Association.
These "principles," however, have no binding effect on the physician.
It must be recognized that malpractice law was developed in relatively
few cases, simply because of the sparsity of litigation. But as the prac-
7. Ewing v. Goode, 78 F. 442 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1897); Sim v. Weeks, 7 Cal. App. 2d
28, 45 P.2d 350 (Dist. Ct. App. 1935)
8. D. LounSELL & H. WILLIAMS, TRIAL OF MEDICAL IALPRACTICE SuiTs 200-02 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as LOUISELL].
9. 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901). See, e.g., Rayburn v. Day, 126 Ore. 135, 268
P. 1002 (1928); Rann v. Twitchell, 82 Vt. 79,71 A. 1045 (1909).
It is interesting to note that §5 of the American Medical Association's Principles of
Medical Ethics rejects this, although in practice the profession clings tenaciously to it.
§5-A physician may choose whom he will serve. In an emergency,
however, he should render service to the best of his ability. Having
undertaken the care of a patient, he may not neglect him; and unless he
has been discharged he may discontinue his services only after giving
adequate notice. He should not solicit patients.
10. Supra note 8, (emphasis added).
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tice of medicine moved in the direction of-an impersonal .business and
left behind the warm personal relationship that had existed between the
physician and his patient, the medical malpractice suit became more
prevalent."
There can be no question that both the quantity and 'quality of medi-
cine practiced today is vastly superior to that of thirty years ago.
Today, however, it is forced to stand alone in a community whose con-
stant mobility prevents the formation of strong personal relationships
between patient and physician, and whose better educated members
have become increasingly inquisitive and critical of the physician with
whom they enter so personal a relationship.
While the discovery of a single definitive answer to the spectacular
rise in malpractice actions is remote, it is clear that the absence of any
genuine rapport between physician and patient is a singularly important
factor. -2 Achieving that rapport is then of great import to bringing
some stability to the current practice of medicine.
11. Steward, supra note 1. See, Breakdown in Doctor-Patient Relationships Shown
by Malpractice; Suits Say Psychologists in C.M.A. Study, BULL. or THE AM. COL.
OF SURGEONS, May-June 1959, 3.
12. One of the leading causes of malpractice suits is the absence of rapport between
doctor and patient. That the patient feels strongly on this score is reflected in a poll
conducted by the American Medical Association a few years ago. Patients complained
that doctors:
60%-do not give patients enough time
54%-hide mistakes for other doctors
51%-are hard to find in an emergency
43%-charge too much
39%-do not show enough personal interest
31%-are too quick to perform surgery
A group of psychologists who conducted a study of the origins of mal-
practice suits concluded that: The growing malpractice problem is
primarily a human relations problem and required human relations
research .... [Sluits are drastic symptoms of a breakdown in the relation-
ship between the doctor and his patient .... [Tihe origins of malpractice
suits depend more upon how the patient feels about the doctor and how
the doctor acts toward the patient .... In order to prevent claims from
originating they recommended: development of standards of conduct
for physicians in hospitals, so physicians will not feel the painful reluctance
they do now in calling attention to substandard practices of a colleague.
Goldman, Are Doctors Ignoring the Law? TRatL, June-July, 1965, at 19, 21. (footnotes
omitted) [hereinafter cited as Goldman]. See generally LouISELL, supra note 8, at
137-38.
Lending some credence to this theory, in a recent issue of the Wall Street Journal
Dr. Milford 0. Rouse, past president of the A.M.A., was quoted as having warned
an A.M.A. meeting: 'We are faced with the concept of health care as a right rather
than as a privilege." The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 7, 1969, 1.
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The Malpractice Suit Per Se
It must be clearly understood that it is not the successful malpractice
suit the physician fears, but rather the very threat of a malpractice
suit.'3 The individual physician believes that regardless of its outcome,
the commencement of a single malpractice suit is enough to do irre-
parable harm to his professional standing, by branding him professionally
incompetent or worse, and cause him serious financial reverses due to a
decreased practice.' 4 The physician is acutely aware that even if he
wins his law suit he often loses a great deal.
In attempting to ameliorate the hazards of a malpractice suit, the
physician has assumed a defensive posture that he feels will aid in pro-
tecting him from such action. In many cases he may be extremely re-
luctant to accept an unknown patient for fear that he may be exposing
himself to an unknown quantity of questionable temperament. I" He will
in all cases attempt to screen new patients carefully, and maintain the
13. Comment, Wisconsin's Good Samaritan Statutes, 48 MARQ. L. REv. 80, 82 (1964).
14. McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAunt. L. REv. 549, 609
(1959).
Apparently the effects of a malpractice action upon the physician's practice are
grossly exaggerated. In a fairly recent survey of some fifty-eight physicians against
-whom malpractice actions had been brought, an article in the J.A.M.A. concluded:
Objectively, the effects of a malpractice suit upon a physician appear
to be much less than generally believed. Not one case was found of a
physician compelled to give up his practice and move, no physicians
lost their licenses, none were rejected from hospital privileges, staffs, or
societies; none were unable to obtain malpractice insurance though a
handful had to switch companies and pay higher rates; none claimed to
have suffered professionally and none suffered socially. Wychoff, The
Effects of a Malpractice Suit Upon Physicians in Connecticut, 176
J.A.M.A. 1096, 1101 (1961).
Five of the physicians actually noted an increase in their practice and only one
stated that he was temporarily injured by the suit. See, How State Medical Society
Executives Size Up Professional Liability, 164 J.A.M.A. 580, 582 (1957). This article
concludes that malpractice claims do not have a "serious or extended effect" on the
physician or his practice.
15. McCoid,-supra note 14, at 608. See also the statement of an anonymous physician
reported in Silverman, Medicine's Legal Nightmare, Part One, SATURDAY EVENING
PosT, April 11, 1959, at 13, 48:
Now, whenever a new patient comes into my office, I ask myself,
"Is this the fellow who's going to sue me?" and, God help me, I'm
beginning to decide my treatments not on the basis of what's best for the
patient, but on what will look best in court.
This article also points to the increased cost of medical care in terms
of, additional consultations and diagnostic procedures which doctors may




proper psychological distance to restrict initial familiarity. The doctor
may be most hesitant to employ new medical techniques for fear he may
be subject to the charge of failing to exercise due care or, even worse,
of experimentation."' This reaction can, of course, only serve to the
detriment of a patient in need of imaginative and bold treatment to
effect a cure.
CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE
The concern for the state of the medical profession is not of recent
vintage. The Code of Hammurabi of 1750 B.C. provided for inter alia,
having an erring physician's hand cut off." Later societies, apparently
faced with a shortage of sufficiently intrepid men to treat their ills
turned to a less drastic form of censure for malpractice, the financial
judgment.
The physician, with extraordinary skill and care, has banded his
numbers together into a tightly knit professional fraternity of common
interests and goals. In accomplishing this the medical profession has
secured to itself an immunity from prosecution for professional negli-
gence that is virtually unassailable. The "conspiracy of silence" is the
tool with which this immunity has been fashioned.'8
The requirement that a patient produce independent expert medical
testimony to establish the proper standard of care 9 and the defendant-
physician's failure to meet that standard, imposes an almost insurmount-
able obstacle to the aggrieved plaintiff. Without the benefit of such
expert medical testimony the jury may not be competent to judge the
defendant's conduct, and a directed verdict will be entered for the
defendant-physician. Despite the indispensibility of such testimony there
has been a traditional reluctance among physicians to testify against their
fellows.20 This has been denominated a "conspiracy of silence." 21
16. See generally L. REGAN, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAW 65 (1965).
17. Id. at 370-72.
18. See Bryan, Good Samaritan Law-Good or Bad?, 15 MERCER L. REv. 477 (1964);
Note, Overcoming the Conspiracy of Silence: Statutory and Common Law Innova-
tions, 45 MINN. L. Rv. 1019 (1961). See also Edwards v. West Texas Hosp., 89 S.W.2d
801 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
19. See Note, Medical Malpractice-Expert Testimony, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 834 (1966).
20. Anyone familiar with cases of this character knows that the so-called
ethical practitioner will not testify on behalf of a plaintiff regardless of
the merits of his case. . . . But regardless of the merits of the plaintiff's
case, physicians who are members of medical societies flock to the defense
of their fellow members charged with malpractice and the -plaintiff is
19691
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It has been argued that mere reluctance to testify does not establish
a "conspiracy of silence" in any precise sense of the word "conspiracy,"
but where the reluctance has been so wide-spread and notorious the
criteria of the definition have been amply met. This "conspiracy" has
been acknowledged, as a matter of judicial notice, by courts in several
jurisdictions.22
In the past twenty years it has become evident that the loyalty which
motivated this "conspiracy of silence" has served to create more prob-
lems than it has solved, much to the detriment of the entire profession.
Many jurisdictions reacted to this extra burden placed upon the plaintiff
by widening the scope of the law and extending legal doctrines to more
relegated, for his expert testimony, to the occasional lone wolf or heroic
soul, who for the sake of truth and justice has the courage to run the risk
of ostracism by his fellow practitioners and the cancellation of his public
liability insurance policy. Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal.2d 465, 484, 234 P.2d
34, 46 (1951).
But gradually the courts awoke to the so-called "conspiracy of silence."
No matter how lacking in skill or how negligent the medical man might
be, it was almost impossible to get other medical men to testify adversely
to him in litigation based on his alleged negligence. Not only would the
guilty person thereby escape from civil liability for the wrong he had
done, but his professional colleagues would take no steps to insure that
the same results would not again occur at his hands. Salgo v. Leland
Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 568, 317 P.2d
170, 175 (1957).
This court recognizes that it is difficult to obtain medical testimony to
substantiate a plaintiffs claim in a malpractice suit, as physicians are
reluctant to testify against each other. Richison v. Nunn, 54 Wash.2d
371, 340 P.2d 793, 802-03 (1959).
21. See Belli, An Ancient Therapy Still Applied: The Silent Medical Treatment,
1 VLL. L. Rv. 250, 259 (1956).
22. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317
P.2d 170 (1957); accord, supra note 20; see Bernstein v. Alameda-Contra Costa Medical
Ass'n, 139 Cal. App. 2d 241, 293 P.2d 862 (1956). Petitioner-physician was expelled
from his local medical society because of a report he had written for a plaintiff
characterizing a fellow physician as "inept and inexpert." In Boswell v. Board of
Medical Examiners, 72 Nev. 20, 293 P.2d 424 (1956), the court enjoined the Board
proceedings to revoke the physician's license because of caustic comments made
about other physicians. In Virgin v. American College of Surgeons, 42 III. App. 2d
352, 192 N.E.2d 414 (1963), there is some indication that his involvement in a
plaintiff's malpractice case was a prime factor in the physician's expulsion from the
American College of Surgeons. In Reynolds v. Struble, 128 Cal. App. 716, 731,
18 P.2d 690, 696 (1933), "It was shown that some of the medical witnesses had ap-
proached the plaintiff's witness and attempted to intimidate him or at least' dissuade
him from testifying under pain of ostracism." See also Ghickstien v. Lipsett, 93 Cal.
App. 2d 391, 405, 209 P.2d 98, 112 (1949). See generally, Note, Malpractice and
Medical Testimony, 77 HARV. L. REV. 333 (1963); Note, Judicial Annulment of Expul-
sions From Private Associations, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 241 (1965).
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finely adjust the scales of justice.23 This trend has been noted by the
medical profession with some degree of alarm, and recently the Cali-
fornia Medical Association has been active in attempting to reverse the
trend.F Reversing the trend, however, without affording the genuinely
aggrieved plaintiff access to competent medical authority can only result
in injustice and a further derogation of the physician-patient relation-
ship. It would be far better to remove the need for the "conspiracy of
silence." 2
23. See Medico-Legal Boomerang: Conspiracy of Silence, TRIAL, Oct.-Nov., 1966, at
15. One significant example is the extension of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. This
doctrine was first applied in Byrne v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863).
In instances where the plaintiff is unable to obtain favorable expert medical testi-
mony the application of the doctrine becomes essential. The application of the doc-
trine is limited by certain well settled principles. The event involved:
1) must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone's negligence;
2) must not be caused by an instrumentality or agency within the
exclusive control of the dependent;
3) must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on
the part of the plaintiff. Supra note 8, at 425.
It is still held in a majority of the states that the doctrine does not apply where
common knowledge or experience is not sufficiently extensive to permit it to be said
that the patient's condition would not have existed but for the negligence of the
doctors. Ayers v. Parry, 192 F.2d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 1951). A further example of the
extention of the doctrine can be seen in Fehrman v. Smirl, 20 Wis. 2d 1, 121 N.W.2d
255 (1963). There the Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated that the question of
negligence in the case "did not lie within the field of common knowledge of layman,"
but went on to hold that a res ipsa loquitur instruction to the jury could be supported
on the basis of expert medical testimony given into evidence at the trial. See generally
Note, The Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Medical Malpractice Cases, 60 Nw.
U.L. REv. 852 (1966).
24. Sheridan, How M.D.'s Are Winning Malpractice Relief, MEDICAL ECONOMICS,
Sept. 16, 1968 at 21.
25. It is in the interest of the medical profession and the patients that
doctors should act boldly and acknowledge their errors, and not ignore
a fellow physician's negligence. In the Cleveland-Marshall Law Review,
May, 1959, Dr. Miley B. Wesson advised physicians to never admit that
the author of a textbook was an authority on the subject when they were
defending themselves in a malpractice case. In my view, this was an
open invitation to doctors to lie their way out of liability; the medical
profession should openly disavow such conduct. ...
We might well paraphrase the words of the late Justice Cardozo, when
he commented on the power of the courts to clean house in the legal
profession:
In the long run the power now conceded will make for the health and
honor of the profession and for the protection of the public. If the house
is to be cleaned, it is for those who occupy and govern it, rather than
for strangers, to do the noisome work. Goldman, supra note 12, at 21.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [
The physician is painfully aware that he is not infallible. He and the
other members of the medical profession must recognize that when a
fellow practitioner has caused harm through a negligent act he must be
held responsible as must any other member of the society. Failing to do
this, and with specific reference to the extraordinary rise in medical
malpractice litigation and the apparent public attitude of increasing dis-
enchantment, can only serve to precipitate legislation and further judicial
decision that will clearly reflect this disenchantment to the overall detri-
ment of the medical profession. The effort must be joint, for it is ex-
tremely unlikely that the individual physician will be willing to act
except in unison with other members of the profession.
A Possible Solution
New Jersey's supreme court has sought to solve the problem for the
benefit of both physician and patient by setting forth rule 4: 25B which
attempts to discourage the filing of baseless professional liability claims
and to make expert medical testimony available to plaintiffs when it is
clear that there is a reasonable basis for the claim. The following is an
outline of this procedure.
(1) The administrative director of the courts maintains a register of
physicians designated by the state of New Jersey Medical Society and a
register of attorneys designated by the supreme court from which he is
able to form as many subpanels as may be required at any one time.
(2) All of the litigants to a malpractice claim are urged to submit
their cases voluntarily and informally to a subpanel of two doctors, two
lawyers and a former justice of the supreme court or former judge of the
superior or county court, who acts as chairman of the subpanel and
votes only in case of a tie, for evaluation, preferably before litigation is
instituted.
(3) The director notifies the defendant of the existence of the claim
and requests that he consent to the informal hearing after consulting as
to the advisability of such action with his own attorney and insurance
carrier.
(4) The hearing is then held informally behind closed doors before
the subpanel with only the parties and their attorneys present.
(5) The plaintiff's claim is then presented either orally or in written
form, and the claimant and his witnesses may then be questioned by the
physician's attorney, if the claimant consents.
Vol. 10:956
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(6) The physician then presents his side of the case, his witnesses do
the same, and they are likewise subject to questioning by the attorney for
claimant, if they agree to such questioning.
(7) The subpanel then considers the evidence presented and brings in
one of two findings: (a) that there is a reasonable basis for the claim; or
(b) that there is no reasonable basis for the claim. No opinion is given
as to the extent of the damages sustained.
(8) If the finding of the panel is unfavorable to the claimant, it recom-
mends that no suit be filed against the physician or,, if one has been filed,
that it be discontinued.
(9) If the finding of the subpanel is favorable to the claimant, the
subpanel recommends that the claim be amicably and expeditiously
settled.
(10) At the commencement of the informal proceeding the claimant
is requested to consent in writing that, if the subpanel disagrees with
his contention, he will not institute suit, or if one is pending, he will
discontinue it.
(11) If the claimant signs this agreement and the subpanel decides
that he has a reasonable basis for his claim (and no settlement is effected),
the director agrees to supply the names of three expert medical witnesses
from a list compiled by the New Jersey Medical Society, any or all of
whom 'will serve as witnesses.
(12) The counsel for the claimant is required, if the subpanel finds no
reasonable basis for the claim, not to institute a suit based thereon, and
if one is pending in which he appears as counsel, he must withdraw. The
claimant, however, is free to retain other counsel to continue the suit or
institute one if no agreement to the contrary has been signed.
(13) All proceedings are strictly confidential and absolutely no record
is made of the proceedings. If medical experts have been made available
to the claimant because the claim has not been settled, the manner in
which the expert witnesses were made available to the claimant is not
disclosed to anyone.
This procedure ensures a fair and equitable hearing for all of the
parties concerned, and effectively serves to eliminate the "conspiracy of
silence, thereby affording a remedy to the genuinely aggrieved patient
and protection to the unfairly accused physician." 26
26. N.J. Sup. CT. R. 4:25B-PRoFEssIo-TAL LIABILITY CLAIMs AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE
MICAL PROFESSION; PROCEDURE.
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GOOD SAMARITAN STATUTES
In 1959, California passed the Medical Practice Act, euphemistically
known as the Good Samaritari Statute, and since that-time thirty-seven
other states have enacted similar legislation." The statutes generally pro-
vide that no physician who in good faith renders emergency care at the
scene of an emergency shall be liable for civil damages resulting from
either acts or omissions, barring, of course, gross negligence.
The public, the legislatures, and the state medical associations had
all hoped that such statutes would encourage physicians to render emer-
gency treatment when called upon. The opposite was true, however, for
a careful examination of the statutes reveals that they do not at all
protect the physician from a malpractice action, and the physician was
quick to sense this.
What they do accomplish, however, is to provide the physician with
an excellent defense to a malpractice action if one is instituted against
him. The need for such legislation is even more dubious when viewed in
light of an article in the New England Journal of Medicine. There the
author concluded:
The first problem with these laws is in assessing the public need
for them. Are doctors being sued who render emergency aid?
There is not a single case of such a suit to have reached the appel-
late level of any jurisdiction in this country. Also, there is no
information of any trial-court cases in the United States. (One
action involving a Massachusetts physician has been reported in
27. ALASKA STAT. nt. 8, § 08.64.365; ALA. Acrs, art. 253 (Supp. 1967); ARK. STAT.
ANN. 5 72-624 (Supp. 1967); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2144 (Supp. 1960); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 52-557b (Supp. 1967); DEl. CODE ch. 17, tit. 24, § 1767 (Supp. 1966);
D.C. CODE, tit. 2, § 142 (Supp. 1968); FLA. STAT. § 768.13 (Supp. 1967); GA. CODE
ANN. § 84-930 (Supp. 1968); IDAHO CODE § 5-330 (Supp. 1968); ILT ANN. CODE, ch. 91,
§ 2a (Supp. 1969); IND. ANN. STAT. § 63-1361 (Supp. 1968); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 65-2891 (Supp. 1968); LA. REv. STAT. § 37:1731; MASS. Ga. LAWS ANN., ch. 112,
§ 12B (Supp. 1969); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 14.563 (Supp. 1969); ME. REv. STAT. ANN, tit.
32, § 3151; MD. ANN. CODE, art. 43 § 149 A; Miss. CODE ANN., § 8893.5 (Supp. 1966);
MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 17-410; NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1152; NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.500
(Supp. 1963); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 329.25; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-1 (Supp.
1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-12-3 (Supp. 1967); N.Y. EDuC. LAW § 6513 (10) (Supp.
1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-17.37 (Supp. 1967); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 230523
(Supp. 1968); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 76, § 5 (Supp. 1969); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12,
§§ 1641, 1642 (Supp. 1969); R.1. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 5-37-14 (Supp. 1968); S.C. CODE,
tit. 46, § 803 (Supp. 1968); S.D. SESSION LAws 1961, ch. 137; TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-622
(Supp. 1968); TEx. Civ. STAT. ANN., art. la (Supp. 1968); VA. CODE ANN. 54-276.9




the Virgin Islands.) There are no published statistics on insurance
claims to indicate this is an area of significant risk. Governor
Kerner of Illinois vetoed such a bill in August, 1963,28 and said
"so far as I can ascertain, the attendant danger (of malpractice
suits) is largely, if not wholly imagined. A systematic inquiry
into all the reported malpractice decisions has failed to disclose
a single roadside instance." 29
An examination of the Good Samaritan Statutes reveals that there
are several problems indigenous to them. First, there is a great diversity
among the statutes regarding exactly 'who is to be relieved of civil
liability. Second, many of the statutes require that emergency medical
care must have been rendered gratuitously before immunity from civil
liability attaches, although some of the statutes fail even to provide a
clearcut definition of gratuitous aid. Third, most of the acts are appli-
cable only where an "emergency" exists, but fail to define what con-
stitutes an "emergency." Fourth, the statutes are vague in defining the
exact degree of misconduct that will be immune from civil action.
Fifth, other statutes could be mistakably interpreted as failing to provide
protection from a possible cause of action for abandonment against a
medical person who ceases to care for an emergency patient when the
patient is delivered to other competent medical personnel.30
Faced with an emergency situation, the doctor is shorn of all of his
protective devices. The customary caution that he normally exercises
is precluded by the sudden and extreme demands of the moment. The
quality and quantity of the medical treatment he renders must of neces-
sity be derogated by the absence of adequate facilities and equipment.
These deficiencies and dangers coupled with the relative inefficacy of
the statutes in protecting the physician from the commencement of the
malpractice suit defeat the very purpose of their passage. The physi-
cian's fears of his liability in rendering aid in an emergency situation are
excessive and irrational; but unless these fears are laid to rest the physi-
cian will be unlikely to assume a burden of liability he feels weighing
heavily upon him. The Good Samaritan Statute, clearly, does nothing to
allay these fears.
28. Illinois has subsequently passed a Good Samaritan Statute, supra note 27.
29. 270 Tim NEw E NGrLAD J. op MEDiciNE, May 7, 1964, at 1003. See letter on file
XVILLIAN, AND MARY LAW REvmw from George E. Hall, Legal Division, American
Medical Association, to the author, August 14, 1968, attesting to the fact that there
have been no cases of this nature.
30. Note, Negligence-Medical Malpractice-Criticism of Existing Good Samaritan
Statutes, 42 Oar. L. REv. 328, 330 (1963).
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IMPOSITION OF A POSITIVE DuTy
Going beyond the mere granting of an immunity as suggested by the
Good Samaritan Statute, and forcing a physician to perform against his
will in an emergency situation through the legislative enactment of a
statute, it has been argued, would violate his rights to due process under
the fourteenth amendment, and subject him to involuntary servitude
prohibited by the thirteenth amendment. The power of the state, how-
ever, over the medical profession has long been recognized as absolute.3 '
A similar argument has been raised by members of the legal profession
appointed to defend the accused in a criminal proceeding. In these cases
the specific question litigated was whether the attorney should be com-
pensated for his services in the absence of a statutory provision. The
majority view supported the proposition that, in the absence of a con-
trolling statute providing for compensation, an attorney assigned a case
may not recover compensation from the state3 2
The majority rule states that the courts do have the power to compel
an attorney to represent an indigent in a criminal proceeding without
compensation absent statutory authority. Even those jurisdictions which
adhere to the minority rule requiring compensation do not hold that an
attorney can refuse to accept his appointment. It is universally held
that an attorney is an officer of the court and may not refuse to serve
save for good and proper reasons.
Those jurisdictions which require an attorney to render his services
gratuitously in criminal cases adhere to one of the two following
rationales. First, "The duty of gratuitous service is correlative to the
special rights and privileges which have been conferred upon the attor-
31. Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581 (1926), (". . . [tihere is no right to practice
medicine which is not subordinate to the police power of the States...."); Dent v.
West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
32. See Pound, What is a Profession?, 19 NOTRE DAME LAwYER 203 (1944); M. PIrsto,
JUDICIAL ADMINISTR.ATION, 810-22 (1946).
In People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin [248 N.Y. 465, 162 NE. 487 (1928)] Judge Cardozo
said:
Membership is a privilege burdened with conditions.... The appellant
was received into that ancient fellowship for something more than private
gain. He became officer of the court, and, like the court itself, an instru-
ment or agency to advance the ends of justice. Id. at 470-71, 162 NE.
at 489. (footnotes omitted).
See also King & Sears, The Ethical Aspects of Compromise, Settlement and Arbitra-
tion, 25 RocnY Mr. L. REV. 490, 492 (1953). The AM. MEDICAL AssN's PmNc pi.s oF
MEDICAL Enrcs § 1 states: "The principal objective of the medical profession is to
render service to humanity with full respect for the dignity of man."
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ney;" 13 and second, that the state's power to license includes the power
to impose such obligations upon the attorney.
It is appropriate to wonder what distinction there is between requiring
an attorney to protect a man's life in a criminal court, and in requiring
a physician to preserve a life in an emergency situation. Is it not logical
that if the attorney, as the only one capable of protecting life and
liberty in the courts is required to serve when called upon, that the
physician as the only one capable of preserving life in an emergency
situation, should be required to serve when and where the need arises?
The duty of service is no less "correlative to the special rights and
privileges which have been conferred upon the" 34 physician.
The attorney is bound by canons of legal ethics which, if violated,
subject him to disbarrment and the attendant loss of his license to prac-
tice law. 5 Contra to a popular belief, the physician is not required to
take the oath of Hippocrates. It is purely ceremonial in nature and has
no legal efficacy. The Principles of Medical Ethics of the American
Medical Association also have no legal efficacy and are merely a sug-
gested framework upon which the physician can construct his own mode
of behavior. It thus appears that human sympathy and a just sense of
professional obligation are the only motivations available to move the
physician to the aid of his fellow man in distress.
STATUTORY IMPOSITION OF DUTY TO ACT
At common law there was no positive duty created where one person
was required to render aid to another in an emergency situation, unless
that person was responsible for the creation of the situation 6 The
courts soon recognized, however, a few areas where the imposition of
such a duty was clearly in the public interest. Examples of such rela-
tionships were those of department store and invitee,zr public carrier
and passenger,38 and master and servant3 9
33. Nabb v. United States, I Ct. Cl. 173 (1864); Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 Utah
548, 133 P.2d 325, 327 (1943); Presby v. Klickitat County, 5 Wash. 329, 31 P. 876
(1892).
34. Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 Utah 548, 133 P.2d 325, 327.
35. Matter of Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 116 NE. 783; People v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162
N.E. 487.
36. W. PRossER, LAW OF TORTS 334 (3d. ed. 1964).
37. See L. S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, 220 Ind. 86, 40 N.E.2d 334 (1942).
38. See Birmingham Ry., L. & P. Co. v. Glenn, 179 Ala. 263, 60 So. II (1912).
See generally supra note 36, at 45.
39. See Hunicke v. Meramec Quarry Co., 262 Mo. 560, 172 S.W. 43 (1914); Szabo
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 132 N.J.L. 331, 40 A.2d 562 (1945).
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As the state of the law progressed, there became discernible a demon-
strable willingness to create liability for failure to act out of purely
moral considerations. The duties arising from the relationship between
parent and child provide a good example. The common law obligations
of parents or guardians to support and care for children of tender age
or infirmity has now, in many instances, become firmly based in statu-
tory acknowledgment.4° The further we move from the familial rela-
tionship, however, the uniting bond becomes weaker and the common
law duty to act becomes more problematical. Statutes creating liability
for omissions in the interest of the public health and welfare are not
uncommon. For example, under federal statute the master of a vessel,
where there is no "serious danger" to his own ship, crew or passengers,
is under a positive duty to render assistance to "every person who is
found at sea in danger of being lost." 41
Closer to the issue of the medical profession's responsibility, physi-
cians in many states are required to report all cases in which it is likely
that injuries suffered by a child have been caused by parental abuse.
In many jurisdictions there is a positive duty placed upon the physician
to report all gunshot and knife wounds to the police.43 Any omission,
regarding these positive duties to act, will subject the erring physician
to the established statutory penalty. Thus it is clear that the states have
40. E.g., Lewis v. State, 72 Ga. 164 (1883); People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68
N.E. 243 (1903); See also Mitchell v. State, 39 Ga. App. 100, 146 S.E. 333 (1929);
Children & Young Person's Act of 1933, 23 Geo. 5, c. 12, §1.
41. Duty of master to assist persons in danger. The master or person in
charge of a vessel shall, so far as he can do so without serious danger to
his own vessel, crew, or passengers, render assistance to every person who
is found at sea in danger of being lost; and if he fails to do so, he shall,
upon conviction, be liable to a penalty of not exceeding $1,000 or imprison-
ment for a term not exceeding two years or both. 46 U.S.C. § 728 (1964).
42. See, e.g., Aaiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-842.01 (Supp. 1964); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 828.041 (Supp. 1963); N.Y. SOcIAL SERCicas LAW § 383-f.
43. See, e.g., NEW YORK PENAL LAw OF 1968 § 265.25 Reports of treatment
of wounds caused by firearms. 1. Every physician attending or treating
a case of bullet wound, gunshot wound, powder burn, or any other
injury arising from or caused by the discharge of a gun, pistol, or other
firearm, or whenever such case is treated in a hospital, sanitarium or
other institution, the manager, superintendent or other person in charge
shall report such case at once to the police authorities of the city, town
or village where such physician, hospital, sanitarium or institution is lo-
cated. The provisions of the section shall not apply to such wounds,
burns or injuries received by a member of the armed forces of the
United States or the state of New York while engaged in the actual




not been hesitant to act to impose affirmative obligations upon physi-
cians when the public health and welfare have been threatened.
It is, of course, most desirable that a man should go beyond merely
abstaining from doing his neighbor violence, and should instead take an
active interest in his welfare. Today our penal laws content themselves
with restraining men from the commission of overt socially undesirable
acts, and leave to the public conscience and the religious community the
responsibility of motivating men in the direction of positive good. Rela-
tive impunity is granted to those whose omissions a righteous man would
brand as reprehensible, and punishment is reserved for those whose omis-
sions have been marked as the particularly proper objects of penal legis-
lation.
The question of imposing a positive duty to act must turn on whether
the freedom to remain inactive to the detriment of one's neighbor
serves ends that are sufficiently desirable to the society to compensate
for the evil that such inaction permits to occur. The weight of such a
burden on the individual is a particularly relevant factor in making
such an evaluation, and where the burden is light, the requirement for
liability for misfeasance is strong. The difficulties involved, therefore, in
forming new socially desirable requirements are no more insurmount-
able than in the case of forbidding undesirable acts.
A European Solution
It is indeed an extraordinary dichotomy that a nation that prides itself
on its humanity and the sophistication of its judicial system should lag
so pitifully behind other nations in acting for the protection of its citi-
zens, by failing to impose a positive duty upon its physicians to render
emergency aid to those injured and in need of immediate medical at-
tention. In modern America this need for legislative action is ever-
growing and the consequences of the failure to act are tragically ac-
centuated each year. In a recent study of the economics of personal
injury it was noted:
S.. fF1 or its increasing mobility, spreading cities, and booming
technology, modem society pays a fearful price in accidental in-
juries. Each year accidents claim 10,000,000 victims, of whom
100,000 are fatalities. In a nation of 180,000,000 people this
means that over 5%1. of the population annually become accident
statistics.
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Pale before the human cost, but staggering in its own right, is
the economic price of accidents. Evidence for recent years
suggests that lost wages and medical expenses alone amount to
almost $5,000,000,000. In addition, there are other, more in-
direct consequences, and the total economic cost of accidents
may well exceed $15,000,000,000.4
Clearly this nation cannot afford, from the standpoint of economics
alone, to allow a practice to continue which contributes to the perpetua-
tion of this staggering loss. When viewed from the humane point of
view, the thought must arise as to how many lives might have been
saved had a positive duty been imposed upon physicians to act in
emergency situations. 45 Requiring the physician to act in an emergency
situation is not the solution to the entire problem of reducing the toll
taken by accidental injury, but it is a beginning in the development of
such an overall solution that can only serve to ameliorate the present
trend.
The needs of the public in a dynamic and ever-changing society
demand a new evaluation of what the law ought to be. Today it is
required of a society that has just passed the 200 million mark to de-
termine if we are to be the keepers of our brothers' lives.
In Europe this question has been answered in the affirmative. The
criminal codes of Denmark, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, and
Turkey establish criminal liability for anyone who refuses to aid per-
sons "in peril" or "in danger of death." 46 Belgium,4 7 France,4 Ger-
many,49 Holland, 0 and the Soviet Union0 ' have also statutorily im-
posed criminal liability on all who fail to act in an emergency situation.
44. Franklin, Chanin & Mark, Accidents, Money, and the Law: A Study of the Eco-
nomics of Personal Injury Litigation, in W. MEYER, DOLLARS, DELAY AND THE AUto-
MOBILE VICTIM 70-71 (1968).
45. See Note, Good Samaritan and Liability for Medical Malpractice, 64 CoLtIM.
L. REv. 1301 (1964).
46. DANISH CRIM. CODE art. 253 ( ), "evident peril to life;" ITALIAN CRIM. CODL
art. 593 ( ), "wounded or otherwise in peril;" POLISH CRIM. CODE art. 247; "in a
situation directly endangering life"; PORTUGUESE CRIMINAL CODE art. 2368 (1964) ap-
plies only when the individual has been "attacked with violence"; RUMANIAN CRIMINAI
CODE, art. 489, "in danger of death" (1964); TURKISH CRIMINAL CODE art. 476 (1964).
"wounded or otherwise in danger of his life."
47. BELGIAN CRIMINAL CODE: art. 422 bis, and art. 422 ter (1960).
48. FERNcH PENAL CODE: art. 63 (1959).
49. GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE art. 330 c. (1871).
50. DUTCH PENAL CODE art. 450 (1960).
51. RUSSIAN PENAL CODE § 127 (1960). See Note, The Failure to Rescue: A Con-




It would be naive to assume that merely enacting legislation imposing
a positive duty upon physicians to render emergency medical aid would
be a panacea to the problems now facing the medical profession. What
it would do, however, would be to force the profession to take a step
in the direction of a practice of medicine that always places human life
above economic considerations. Clearly, the physician who refuses to
stop to save a life is, in essence, saying that he places a higher value
on the economic considerations of the moment than he does on the
human life at stake.52 There are those who would say that this is grossly
unfair. They would argue that the physician is placed in an untenable
position; for if he stops to render aid, his altruism will most probably
yield a malpractice suit, and the specter of the destruction of his pro-
fessional standing in the community.
First, it is to be remembered that there has never been a reported
case of medical malpractice action for care rendered at the scene of an
emergency. Second, if the physician is practicing in one of the thirty-
seven jurisdictions that have enacted Good Samaritan Statutes he is liable,
in most instances, only for gross negligence or bad faith in the rendering
of his medical treatment.
But, in all fairness, it must be remembered that it is to the individual
physician that we should direct our attention. He cares not for statistics
and is interested only in his liability. How can he be sure that a multi-
tude of these actions have not been quietly settled out of court, regard-
less of their merit, to avoid the ensuing "disgrace" to the defendant-
physician? Suppose that he is the first such emergency medical mal-
practice suit? There the statistics would offer him little comfort.
It would be unconscionable not to give every consideration to a man
who has devoted a major portion of his life to the acquisition of a skill
that is vitally needed by the society. It is not unreasonable, despite the
apparent groundless nature of these fears, to strive to allay them, and
attempt to ameliorate the legal position of the altruistic physician.
A rule of law that would incorporate the best of the European
statutes and Good Samaritan Statutes, while maintaining the perspective
and discretion shown by the panels conducted under New Jersey rule
4:25BrO would offer the victim of an accident an increased chance for
52. Supra note 26; See generally, Karcher, Malpractice Claims Against Doctors: New
Jersey's Screening Procedures, 53 A BA.J. 328 (1967).
53. See Goldman, Are Doctors Ignoring the Law, 4 TRIAL 19 (1966).
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survival and the physician all he could reasonably expect to be legally
granted. He would be required to act, but would be liable only for a
lack of good faith or gross negligence in the rendering of emergency
medical treatment and this is, as has already been stated, not the concern
of the competent practitioner. Further, the physician would be pro-
tected from the attendant notoriety of the malpractice action through
a preliminary hearing by a panel of experts that would render an un-
emotional and educated analysis of the merits of the complaint. After
having received a fair and unbiased hearing, if the physician is found
to have performed so negligently as to make him legally liable he should
be willing to make amends for his error or omission. For the medical
profession to ask for anything more is to request, in essence, that this
profession be set above the law.
The scientific strides of the medical profession are impressive, but it
is evident that they are beginning to overtake the profession's ethical
standards. Unless action is soon taken to relieve the socio-economic
pressures upon the physician and to adjust this disparity, there can only
be a continued increase in malpractice litigation, with an attendant
derogation of the physician's position in the community.
EARLE T. HALE
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